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UNKNOWN MORAL TERRITORY1 
ON PRENATAL DIAGNOSTICS AND THE DECISION 
TO CONTINUE OR TERMINATE A PREGNANCY: 
A CLINICAL ETHICS STUDY IN FRANCE 
 
Introduction 
 
Throughout the 20th century, diagnostic techniques have been improved in industrialized countries, yielding 
greater knowledge about the health of the embryo, of the fetus, and of the mother. They have raised ethical, 
political, and legal issues that deserve our attention. Initially, research and treatment focused on perinatal care: 
the mother’s health during and after pregnancy, and that of the infant in the first months of life. Research was 
then redirected to the embryo, for the purpose of diagnosing pathologies more accurately. This trend was due in 
part to the fact that the risk of contagious disease had largely been vanquished. In the 1940s, the work of A. 
Hertig, G. Pincus, and J. Rock also steered science in this direction. The description of the human karyotype 
dates from 1956. Cytogenetics and techniques for in vitro cell culture were developed and improved, alongside 
developments in ultrasonography. Once it was possible to diagnose in utero pathologies for which postnatal 
treatment is sometimes lacking, the parental couple and medical team caring for the woman during the 
pregnancy faced new questions: if the diagnosis of pathology is certain, should the pregnancy continue or be 
terminated? In the name of what, and in favor of whom could such a decision be made? These issues are still at 
stake today, even if non-invasive techniques have become available for prenatal diagnosis (Schmitz 2013).  
Social sciences have studied how the use of these techniques has spread in various national contexts, their 
specificities and institutional organizations of prenatal diagnosis consult (Vassy 2011, 2014b). In addition, they 
have studied the social and professional acceptance of such techniques (Vassy 2005 et 2012). This article has a 
different purpose: to “closely examine the ways healthcare professionals and patients live with these 
technologies on a daily basis, and the impact of the technologies on their practices, expectations, and self-image, 
as either individuals or professionals” (Massé 2010). 
This impact may be observed at different moments, for example when a diagnosis is revealed to patients (Legros 
2005; Vassy and Champenois-Rousseau 2014). This article focuses on another moment: when the « patients » 
are led to reflect on the possibility to terminate or not the pregnancy after having been informed. It intends to 
highlight their reasons to make their decision in one way or another. We cannot presume that they are similar to 
the reasons we know of, in the cases of abortion without an indication for a medical reason (Bateman 1979-1980, 
1982a and 1982b ; Memmi 2003 ; Boltanski 2004).  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 This title echoes Rayna Rapp’s description of pregnant women confronting a prenatal diagnosis as “moral 
pioneers” (R. Rapp 2000), also referred to by C. Williams et al. (2005).  
Most of the studies that have been published on this topic concentrate on the point of view of medical teams 
(Williams 1982 and 2002 ; Geller 2002 ; Dommergues 2010). The present article intends to contribute to a better 
understanding of the patients’ point of view (McCoyd 2009 ; Mirless 2000 and  2011). More specifically, it deals 
with the patients’ point of view when the diagnosis reveals a genetic disease and raises the issue of hereditary 
illnesses (Dekeuwer and Bateman 2011 et 2013). Here, the term “patient” describes either the pregnant woman 
alone, or the parental couple. These people are the medical team’s “patients” in the literal sense of the word, for 
they are interlocutors in a healthcare situation. They are also their “patients” in a more metaphorical 
understanding: because they are facing a painful ordeal, they are treated with special attention by the healthcare 
team. 
Here, I aim at presenting the reasons formulated by the patients in order to ground their decisions to terminate or 
not the pregnancy. The focus of my study is not the rhetoric of justification (Boltanski, 1990, Boltanski et 
Thévenot, 1991) which has been already examined in the case of abortion without medical indication (Memmi, 
2003 ; Boltanski, 2004). I rather intend to highlight the way the patients deliberate, the rythm and course of their 
reflection, their doubts and concerns, the influence of their personal and family history on their decisions.  
In order to do so, I would like to present a part of the results of a clinical ethics study that I have supervised for 
the Clinical Ethics Center based in Cochin Hospital (Paris, France) between 2011 and 2014. This study 
investigated the reasons put forth by patients who confronted the question of terminating a pregnancy after they 
were informed about a prenatal diagnosis. The first part of this article will reveal the legal and social context of 
the study, its goal and methodology, how it proceeded, and the pathological situations encountered. Its second 
part will present and analyze the reasons formulated by women and parental couples facing the decision to 
continue or terminate a pregnancy. Finally, the article will examine the patients’ complex relationship to the 
medical decision at stake. The analysis of the interviews enables to perceive the ordeal they experience and the 
way they confront the suspicion of “eugenics choice”.  
 
Study presentation  
 
The legal and social context 
 
To understand the point of the study, it is necessary to specify the French legal framework for medical 
termination of pregnancy. The right to choose to terminate a pregnancy is legal since 1975 and the cost of the 
procedure is covered by national health insurance. It is allowed without any indication of a medical reason up to 
12 weeks of pregnancy since 2001. After these 12 weeks, an indication of a medical reason becomes necessary. 
In such cases, an abortion can be performed “at any time [in the pregnancy] if there is a strong probability that 
the child to be born has an especially serious condition, recognized as incurable at the time of diagnosis” (art. L. 
2113-1of the French Public Health Code, Code de la Santé Publique, CSP). In 2001, the CSP adopted the term 
“voluntary termination of pregnancy for medical reasons” (art. R. 2213-1). When a pregnant woman wishes to 
terminate her pregnancy on the basis of a medical reason, she must send her request to a Centre Pluridisciplinaire 
de Diagnostic Prénatal (Multidisciplinary Prenatal Diagnostics Center). It will decide whether or not to accept it. 
If the woman or the parental couple’s request to terminate the pregnancy is validated, they are granted with a 
week of reflection to confirm their wish. This type of center, subject to licensing by the Agence de la 
Biomédecine every five years, was created to ensure follow-up on prenatal screening procedures (art. L. 2231-1, 
CSP). Their role is to inform patients about the diagnosis or prognosis of the condition, and to provide 
counseling services. The very concept of prenatal diagnosis is defined by the law as all of the “medical practices 
carried out for the purpose of detecting in utero in the embryo or fetus any especially severe condition” (art. L. 
223-1, CSP).  
Therefore, there is no question as to the legal possibility of terminating the pregnancy as long as the medical 
indication meets the criteria for incurability or special severity indicated by the law. Because the costs of the 
procedure are covered by universal health insurance, any economic barrier to terminating the pregnancy is 
eliminated. The questions that arise are related to other issues: for the pregnant woman or parental couple, that of 
the continuation or termination of the pregnancy, as a function of what prenatal screening makes it possible to 
learn about the future life of the unborn child; for the medical team, the diagnosis of an especially serious disease 
or disorder, incurable at the time of diagnosis, and the position the team will adopt in relation to any request that 
may be forthcoming from the pregnant woman or the parental couple, regarding continuing or terminating the 
pregnancy; for the society at large, that of the organization of the health care system and its policy information 
regarding prenatal diagnosis. 
 
Objective  
 
The study presented here focuses on the deliberation process and the course of the patients’ reflection after a 
prenatal diagnosis was revealed to them. It deals with the way they convince themselves about the relevance of 
such and such reason to terminate or not the pregnancy. The interviews with the patients were made after the 
consult in which they were informed about the diagnosis, and before they made their decision about continuing 
or terminating the pregnancy. They were presented to the patients as a specific moment of ethical conversation 
(Parker, 2012), aside from the medical consults.   
The study presented here was driven above all by the question of meaning, “the meaning an agent actually 
subjectively intends, on a particular historical occasion” (Weber 1956). It sought to understand this meaning as it 
was stated in the process of making the decision and not in retrospect. As a matter of fact, in the time following 
the decision, individual memory and reflection intervene (Schütz 2010) and are likely to color or change the 
reasoning given for the decision. Finally, the purpose of the interviews was not only to amass factual 
information. It was also to acquire a genuine grasp of the feelings, values, beliefs, convictions, and 
interpretations making up the heart of the experience confronted by patients, the medical team and, in some 
cases, patient proxies.  
 
Methodology  
 
The study is based on the clinical ethics research methodology as it has been elaborated by the Clinical Ethics 
center based in Cochin Hospital. It was chosen because it allows to gather factual information and to elaborate a 
qualitative approach of medical decisions and their ethical dimension. As a matter of fact, it maintains some 
kinship to medical anthropology as theorized by A. Kleinman. Both pay attention to the way in which the agents 
in the medical situation, caregivers, patients, and families, experience and formulate the ethical issues in 
healthcare situations (Geertz 1973; Kleinman 1988 and 1997; Parker, 2012).  
This study was carried out between 2011 and 2014 in a prenatal screening center in Paris. It involved a team of 5 
interviewers trained in clinical ethics, coming from a variety of professional and academic horizons (psychology, 
philosophy, law, medicine, civil service/social affairs administration). It proceeded by semi-directive interviews 
(lasting between 45 minutes and two hours, depending on the interviewee). They were made by a team of two 
persons trained in clinical ethics, one of whom is a practicing medical professional and one of whom is not, in 
order to obtain two different perspectives on the case. It constituted a series of case studies related to the same 
decision. Without seeking exhaustive knowledge, the study intended to base its findings on a sample size beyond 
which the addition of more cases would not add anything to the knowledge already acquired (Glaser and Strauss 
1967). It required constant attention to the feelings of the patients who agreed to be interviewed. We were 
careful not to offend them with the questions we asked, at a time when they were going through a painful ordeal.  
 
The study unfolded in three phases. First, a protocol was drafted in collaboration with the medical team at this 
center (over 9 months). The protocol established that a member of the medical team, designated as the “referring 
person,” would explain the clinical ethics study to the patient (the pregnant woman or parental couple). Once a 
patient had given preliminary consent to participate, this referring person put us in touch with the woman or 
couple.  
During 18 months, a series of 28 interviews were carried out with patients (involving 5 women consulting the 
center alone and 23 couples). We recorded some standard information: age, situation, family history; gestational 
age, pregnancy profile and history, family history of disability or disease; the circumstances of the prenatal 
screening, and the effects associated with the diagnosis. We sought to understand the patients’ conceptualization 
of disability and disease. We also explored their knowledge of the law and their opinion of it. We tried to grasp 
the importance of other people’s opinion to them: their family, friends, colleagues at work, and society as a 
whole. They explained to us what they saw as the chief motivations for their decision to continue or terminate 
the pregnancy and the “ethical” dimension of this decision. 
We combined these interviews with 7 interviews carried out with members of the medical team (one nurse, two 
midwives, a geneticist, a psychologist, and two obstetrician-gynecologists, one of whom is also a sonograph 
technician). We sought to understand their respective career paths and the way they conceive of their profession, 
in relation to the ethical issues raised by the decision to terminate a pregnancy for medical reasons. Because it 
was not the purpose of the study, we did not sift the findings of these interviews with the aim of determining 
whether certain opinions matched up to certain professions within the prenatal screening team (Parker, 2012). 
Instead, we chose to identify the ethical, professional, and scientific commitment each associates with her work, 
in order to shed light on the nature of the patient/doctor relationship established by the Prenatal Diagnostics 
Center. We examined the overall context in which decisions are made, and the various agents’ reasons to agree 
or not wit the patient’s point of view.2 
After the interview phase, the next step was thematic analysis of the interview data. It intended to identify the 
reasons to terminate or not the pregnancy, the terms in which the meaning is expressed, and the ethical 
dimension associated with it (9 months).  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 This other part of the study will be presented in another text.  
 Pathologies of the encountered clinical situations  
 
The pathologies revealed by the prenatal screening were of very different types. Nine couples confronted the 
diagnosis of a deadly pathology. For the other 19, the pathology was not life-threatening.  
 
Box 1: Pathologies diagnosed by prenatal screening 
9 deadly pathologies 
1 polymalformative syndrome  
2 trisomy 18 
3 cardiopathies 
1 trisomy 13 
1 fetal immobility syndrome  
1 chondrodysplasia 
 
19 non-lethal pathologies (including 6 cases of trisomy 21) 
The following pathologies were perceived by patients as extremely serious: 
1 intrauterine growth retardation + dysmorphism 
1 microcephaly due to infection  
1 DiGeorge syndrome  
1 poly-malformative syndrome  
1 Turner syndrome + VSD  
1 chromosomal anomaly of the gonosomes + IUGR 
1 unbalanced t(2;12) translocation (del2q37)  
 
The following pathologies were perceived as serious by patients without certainty: 
2 spina bifida 
2 ageneses of the corpus callosum 
1 Peutz-Jeghers syndrome  
1 facioscapulohumeral muscular dystrophy 
 
The reasons to terminate or not the pregnancy 
 
To get familiar with the reasons for which women and parental couples decide to continue or terminate a 
pregnancy in France is a delicate task. First of all, in this country as elsewhere (Asch 1999), one reason is 
frequently mentioned as a good-enough explanation of the choice to terminate a pregnancy: that of an 
unfavorable social context to disability. In addition, this issue is too often covered by the media and discussed by 
bioethicists in ways that are furious or fiercely advocatory, especially in relation to cloning and the “Brave New 
World” utopia. Some researchers in social sciences, politicians, health professionals, church spokesmen 
condemn eugenics choices supposedly made by future parents and medical teams (Vassy et Champenois-
Rousseau 2012; Gaille and Viot, 2013). As this study shows, things are more complex and need a thorough 
examination before any moral judgment may be elaborated on the decision to terminate or not a pregnancy made 
on the basis of a medical indication. 
In the vast majority of the cases examined (24 of 28), the decision was made to terminate the pregnancy. Of the 
four decisions to continue the pregnancy, two involved fatal pathologies and two non-fatal pathologies. As we 
observe, the fatal character of the pathology does not ground the decision to terminate the pregnancy, the non-
fatal character of the pathology does not justify the decision to continue the pregnancy.  
Two main reasons were elaborated by patients: personal and family stability, and the quality of life for the child 
to be born. They are not unheard of in French context (Dusart et Thouvenin, 1995). However, they have been 
identified mainly in studies on health professionnals’ point of view. In addition, as formulated by patients, they 
concentrate much more questions and worries than the ideas of a “life of suffering for the child” or that of “an 
unbearable burden for the family” may convey. The reason associated with the quality of life of the child to be 
born refers to the organic as well as to the psychic dimension of the person. It also includes the lack or 
insufficiency of social life and the perspective of a « medicalized » life. Finally, it relates to the issue of caring 
for a sick or disabled person when her parents are deceased. As far as the personal and family stability is 
concerned, the problem is not the « burden » to raise a sick or disabled person. It rather lies in the capacity of her 
parents, brothers and sisters and family at large to welcome her and to go on in their own lives. This reason 
focuses on the psychic capacities of the family members. It is implicity grounded on a conception of the 
individual envisioned not as a separate being but in the web of social and affective relationships. Other reasons 
were formulated. But they were conceived as non-decisive : the social and economic context in which the child 
to be born would be raised; the spiritual or religious dimension of the reflection. The interviews revealed the 
process of hierarchization that took place in it in order to distinguish between actual reasons to terminate or not 
the pregnancy and what we may call « contextual » elements of the decision.  
 
Two preponderant reasons for action: personal and family stability, and the quality of life for the child to be born 
 
First of all, in most of the interviews, a cluster of expressions, questions, and concerns formed around the idea of 
personal and family stability. It constituted the primary and principal reason. It is formulated with regard to 
oneself, to the couple and to the family with children who are already born. Often, it is accompanied by anxious 
self-examination about one’s ability, as an individual, couple, or family, to cope with disease, disability, and the 
prospect of a short life expectancy. This reason was especially striking in the two cases where the pregnancy had 
been achieved through assisted reproduction techniques. In these situations, couples say they cannot bear the 
idea of a child who is disabled or ill, after all of the difficult reproductive procedures they have had to undergo. 
“I’ve suffered enough to do without having anyone preach to me about my duty,” explained Valeria. “Raising a 
child involves your heart and your mind. You rely on your dreams. In this case, it’s impossible. No one dreams 
of having a child like ours.”  
Beyond these two cases, it appears in most of the interviews. For example, Yasmina attended the interview 
alone, and was confronted with the decision to undergo a second medical termination of pregnancy. She 
expressed her search for stability in reference to three factors in her personal and family life: her husband “who 
can’t do anything without [her],” the needs of her first child, and lastly, her own career (she had gone back to 
school, and considered that keeping the child would endanger her ability to study and work).  
In some cases, this reason was expressed with absolute certainty. Marc and Marianne spoke of a “cross to bear,” 
of “self-sacrifice”: they mentioned friends who had divorced, “driven mad” after they had had a disabled child. 
In their eyes, a disabled person “disrupts everything, family, lifestyle choices, where to live”. In other cases, the 
decision was the final step in a thought process that acknowledged doubt and hesitation. For example, Marielle 
and Jean, aged 33 and 34, already have a two-and-a-half-year-old child. The second pregnancy was already 
underway when they were informed about the pathological condition of their first child. For the second 
pregnancy, a sonography performed at 18 weeks of gestational age, was recommended as a “formality”. It 
showed the fetus had a cardiac malformation: agenesis of the pulmonary valves - a defect operable with a 
success rate of 70-80%. As soon as they were informed about this condition, they began wondering about their 
capacity to deal with open-heart surgery. They disagreed: he was in favor of MTP, while she opposed it, 
somewhat. However, they described themselves as going through the painful ordeal together, sharing the same 
types of questions. Jean indicated he had a “history” (meaning a history of mental illness): he attempted suicide 
at the age of 23, and his brother had died four years ago. Marielle described herself as a psychologically fragile 
person. Neither of them could see themselves “making a radical life change,” because they were fulfilled by their 
employment and the time they spend with their first child. They also said their goals were to preserve their 
“home” and couple. However, before we met them, Marielle and Jean had decided to “take the time” to think “to 
the best of [their] abilities,” and to discuss the matter with other physicians, parent groups, and Catholic priests. 
They also saw their participation in the clinical ethics interview as a way of clarifying their ideas to themselves.  
 
The second cluster of expressions, questions, and concerns formed around the idea of the quality of life possible 
for the unborn child, throughout his or her lifetime. It often paired with the first reason. It involved various 
questions: will the child suffer? Will her/his life be highly “medicalized?” Will she/he be able to speak, walk, 
eat, lead an “autonomous” life, love a partner, and have children? Will she/he be able to work? Won’t she/he be 
stigmatized by intolerant social views? For example, when Tang learned that the child his wife was carrying had 
trisomy 21, he wished to have the pregnancy terminated. He imagined the child would be unhappy as an adult: 
unable to marry, the butt of everyone’s mockery. 
When this reason is put forward, it is often formulated as an inability to accept the fact that one is giving birth to 
“a life of suffering.” In the name of love and moral responsibility, continuing the pregnancy is described as a 
harmful or egotistical decision. “Out of love for our child, we are stopping,” Arielle and Louis told us. Their 
primary motivation was to “avoid a life of suffering for the little thing.” They attributed this suffering to the 
concept of “severe mental retardation” and an inability to breathe (a small nose), the result of a rare and complex 
pathology.  
The belief that the human condition is difficult for everyone, both the fit and unfit, emerged from several 
interviews. This conviction was mobilized to support terminating the pregnancy. Mathieu, Caroline’s partner, 
found out that the child the couple was expecting presented an anomaly of the sex chromosomes. The possible 
consequences of this anomaly for the child were testicular cancer, sterility, and anatomical malformations. Even 
though the life of the baby was not in danger, Mathieu believed it was his “duty as a father” to “ensure that the 
child has luck on his side,” because “life on this planet is difficult.” And the destructiveness of human beings is 
going to make it even worse. Mathieu said he wants to provide his children with “the maximum.” As a result, he 
was critical of the way society stigmatizes disability but considered legitimate to devote more resources to the 
births of healthy children. Maria, an undocumented foreigner working as a domestic, was in France for 11 years. 
She told us that in her opinion, it was strange to want to keep a child with a disability in such a complicated 
world. Her reasoning mingled the life prospects of the child she was carrying and her own: “Life is already hard 
enough, so it’s difficult to have a child with a disability, too.” 
In certain cases, personal experience with disability bolsters the conviction that disability has a negative impact 
on life quality. This experience is usually cited to justify a decision to terminate the pregnancy. The future of the 
child in gestation is presented as being too painful to continue the pregnancy in reference to an overly negative 
personal, familial or professional experience of disease or disability. The child Brunehilde and Emmanuel were 
expecting presented a relatively mild type of muscular dystrophy, inherited from Emmanuel. From the outset, the 
parents firmly asserted their intention to put an end to the chain of transmission of the disease. In their eyes, to 
do so was an “act of bravura,” motivated by the wish to avoid giving birth to a child who would experience the 
same “frustration” as Emmanuel when he learned of his “difference.” 
 
Significant contextual elements but non-decisive reasons 
 
Other reasons were put forward in the interviews, but they were not formulated as decisive ones, even though in 
certain cases, they might be considered to play an indirect role in the decision. As a matter of fact, they 
contributed to the parents’ concern for the future child’s quality of life. First of all, societal intolerance for 
disability in France was a factor. The patient sometimes mentioned the lack of infrastructure for caring for 
persons with disabilities and/or serious diseases at various ages (in a quarter of the interviews). When intolerance 
for people with disabilities was cited, evaluations of the situation in France diverged significantly. Serena, 
expecting a child with trisomy 21, decided to continue her pregnancy. She was one of the only ones to express 
sharp criticism of the situation in France, comparing terminating the pregnancy to euthanasia. She pointed out 
contrasts between attitudes in France and the ones in her home culture, Catholic Brazil, pro-life in every form. 
“Is there anyone on Earth who is normal?” she asked. She criticized French society for “wanting perfect people.” 
Malika’s viewpoint was different. She wished to terminate her pregnancy (the fetus had been diagnosed with 
dwarfism). Nevertheless, in her opinion, persons with disabilities are treated much better in France than in the 
other two countries she is familiar with – Algeria, where she was born, and Egypt, her husband’s homeland. 
There, she said, society does nothing for people with disabilities. The parents of disabled children are viewed at 
best with compassion and at worst with suspicion: “It’s true, there, we’d have gotten either pity or questions: 
‘What on earth did that mother do wrong, to end up with a child like that?’ And you can’t build normal 
relationships on pity.” Malika was one of the only respondents who broached the subject of social eugenics, 
saying screening practices raised ethical issues for her: “If they keep this up, pretty soon we’ll have the kind of 
society Hitler wanted.” 
 
A second significant contextual element of the patients’ reflection is the religious or spiritual dimension. 
Religious beliefs, spirituality, religious background, and all other forms of relationships to the “religious” were 
also mentioned by the “patients” in half of the interviews, with or without prompting. Often, it was shared with 
other family members. For example, when Yasmina, a Muslim, spoke of her faith, she said that she and her 
husband had been “a little concerned” in relation to their religion. They had discussed the matter with “scholars 
of religion.” The latter tended to approve of the medical termination of pregnancy. “He [the imam] told us, ‘If 
you know raising a handicapped child will be unbearable for you, you have no religious obligation to do it.’” 
Yasmina went on to say that even if the imam had disapproved of medical termination of pregnancy, she would 
not have changed her mind. Yasmina did mention that her religious belief had comforted her in her difficult 
circumstances: “everything, both good and bad, comes from God, who is bound to send [me] a normal child in 
the end.”  
When we met with couples, they had not always agreed beforehand to a shared, established interpretation of the 
religious message. Min, a Buddhist, perceived medical termination of pregnancy as a murder that would create 
“bad karma” for the family, because the natural flow of things had been stopped.  Her husband Tang disagreed, 
seeing this vision of religion as too monetized. He said that only the spirit mattered. He added: “you let go of the 
body.”  
In few cases, facing the decision to continue or terminate the pregnancy prompted a crisis in regard to the 
nominal religion, or at least a detachment from it. Maria stated that she is a Catholic, but immediately adds that 
she “doesn’t care,” and that she disagreed with the official Church position on abortion. Valeria emphasized the 
idea that her decision had severed her from her religion: “Until yesterday, I was a practicing Catholic; now, I am 
taking a break.”  
 “Religion” or “spirituality” was considered as a significant but a non-decisive reason to the patients who 
referred to it. It contributed to give shape to their reflections, and often served as a moral compass in both types 
of decisions - to continue and to terminate the pregnancy. However, religion, as a culture, text, or institution, 
appeared very open to interpretation, and its normative power over the situation quite limited, in a way similar to 
that observed by sociologist Séverine Mathieu in assisted reproduction clinical cases and to that analysed by 
Habermas on more general grounds (Habermas 2006; Mathieu 2013). 
  
 
The dizzying heights where decision is taken 
 
In addition to letting us know about the reasons to terminate or not a pregnancy in patients’ mind, the interviews 
gave a privileged access to a deliberative and complex process focused on a decision to be made. They let us 
understand the ordeal they experience. In addition, they offered us some elements to explain why the issue of 
“who decides?” is a key issue in France: even though french society may be described as individualistic up to a 
certain extent, the law grants the medical team with the responsibility to decide to continue or terminate the 
pregnancy. Patients were generally extremely surprised when they get to know of the content of the law. They 
claimed to be the only legitimate decision-makers. As a result, in the interviews, they elaborated a reflection very 
different from the one we may know of in other contexts, in which their part in the decision-making is 
undisputed and in which they may prefer, reversely, to devolve their right to decide to the medical team (Rapp, 
2000). Finally, in these interviews, their deliberation also reveals itself as being partially determined by a social 
context in which the suspicion against « eugenics choices » is strongly expressed.  
 
“I am the one to decide”: a unanimous and often gendered claim 
 
The interviews revealed both widespread ignorance of the law, and a unanimous demand: that “patients” be the 
sole authorities in deciding whether to continue or terminate the pregnancy. When the “patients” were informed 
of the actual text of the law, often in the course of the interview itself, or few days before during the consult with 
the medical team, they expressed great surprise. In their opinion, “it goes without saying” that the mother or 
parental couple should have the final word in the decision. In some cases, patients sought advice from someone 
they knew: some of them cited family and friends, while others suggested religious counselors. But these 
discussions only rarely had an impact on the decision. In every situation, “being judged by society” was rejected 
as irrelevant to the decision. Lastly, although the patients considered that it was the role of the medical team to 
provide information and counseling. They did not believe that the team should be entitled to any say in the final 
decision – contrary to the provisions of the law. “It is our business, and no one else should be able to choose for 
us”, Vanessa and Julien asserted. As for Marianne and Marc, they intended to decide for themselves “because 
[we] were responsible” and because they, and no one else, would live with the consequences of their decision. 
Therefore, whatever they decide, the “patients” want to take responsibility for the consequences of their 
decision. To account for this position, it is not enough to refer to an overall analysis of the evolution of the 
patient/doctor relationship in France since the 1980s, culminating in the passage of the law on patients’ rights in 
2002. The most significant point here seems to be that persons confronted with a decision to continue or 
terminate a pregnancy consider themselves as “responsible” for the child who will be born to such a degree that 
they sometimes renounce the birth. In their opinion, the legal framework should reflect this position of 
responsibility, above all. As a result, from an ethical point of view, they feel that they are on shaky ground in 
relation to the law. 
 
In addition, in many cases the couples granted the woman the leading role in making the decision, although they 
did express a concern for consensus and shared decision-making. The partners might not reach agreement at the 
same time, but harmony was seen as desirable. Claudine and Claude, for example, took pride in finally having 
made the decision as a couple. They looked for “the right decision” together. In another configuration, Yasmina 
presented herself as the woman who had made the decision, albeit with the approval of her husband and the 
imam. Similarly, according to Mathieu, the weight of the decision is not equally distributed within the couple. 
He deliberately refrained from saying anything during an appointment with the medical team, feeling that 
Caroline had to be the one to decide.  
Several factors explain why, in most situations, there was a feeling that the woman’s decision should take 
precedence. The first and most obvious is that the woman is the one who is physically implicated in the 
pregnancy. The living presence of the unborn child is a constant reality to her. She is the one who will bear the 
brunt of the consequences of the decision, even socially: she was pregnant, and now she isn’t. What happened? 
What did she do? Why? This factor seemed to carry more weight in situations where the pregnancy was already 
past the first trimester, and the woman could feel the fetus’s movements. But it was not confined to them.  
Nevertheless, it is important to point out that this primacy was not unanimously conferred on the woman by our 
couples: two made decisions to continue a pregnancy, overriding the woman’s desire to terminate it. Fleur was 
afflicted with a syndrome she was opposed to passing on, like Emmanuel and Brunehilde, in the name of the 
moral responsibility not to transmit a disease when it has been diagnosed prior to birth. She began the interview 
by citing all the reasons she had for terminating the pregnancy. She told us she was familiar with “the hospital 
world,” and that being perceived as a person with a disease had always been a source of suffering for her. Since 
childhood, she was monitored closely. To avoid any risk of passing on the disease, she initially did not wish to 
have a child. Married, she would have preferred to adopt. She finally agreed to undertake a pregnancy because 
her husband was opposed to adopting a child. When, as a pregnant mother, she learned the results of the 
choriocentesis, she told us she “collapsed.” She appeared to be torn: her wishes conflicted with those of her 
husband and both of their families. Should she obey her own desires, and terminate the pregnancy, or “sacrifice 
herself” for her husband and the families? As “very religious Catholics,” they would not be able to understand 
her decision. Because of these elements, she finally made her way to the decision to continue the pregnancy.  
 
Grief caused by the decision 
 
The process of decision was perceived as a terrible ordeal. The will to take responsibility for the decision does 
not eliminate doubt, guilt, shame, and anxiety about the present and future and rather go together with them: 
“Yes, it is ethical... it is painful,” Claudine told us, without specifying what she meant by the term “ethical.” Our 
respondents said or showed that engagement in ethical deliberation confronted them with a fundamental 
difficulty: ambivalence about a decision that might have been different, except for the small number of cases that 
appeared to be devoid of “uncertainty.” Arnaud described being caught “between a rock and a hard place”. He 
expressed the feeling of being forced to choose between two solutions, neither of which is desirable. What 
makes this time particularly painful for people facing the decision to continue or terminate a pregnancy is the 
prospect that a different decision could be considered. There are pros and cons to both sides. Moreover, in the 
future, they cannot count on anything that will justify or condemn their choice. For example, Arielle and Louis, 
who decided to terminate Arielle’s pregnancy, made this comment about their decision: “For the love of our 
child, we are stopping. But we could just as easily say that for the love of our child, I cannot do that to him; take 
away his life. It is a strong argument either way.” The possibility that the diagnosis might be mistaken, the fact 
that any diagnosis of the fetus’s health and the future of the child is uncertain, increased the difficulty of making 
a decision for some. But this was not always the case: in some situations, the uncertainty was perceived as a 
disqualifying factor. It led directly to a decision to terminate the pregnancy. 
Moreover, the interviews do not confirm the idea that the decision to interrupt the pregnancy implies emotional 
“disinvestment in the baby.” (C. Allamel-Raffin 2008; Boltanski 2004). One third of the interviews described the 
decision made – to interrupt the pregnancy – as a decision to “kill the baby”, incuding in some situations of first 
term pregnancy. For those who use this expression, the decision is not lightly taken, even if the law permits 
medical termination of pregnancy. Very often, the couple or the pregnant mother speak of their “baby,” not of a 
“fetus,” and plan to “say goodbye” to him. They think about a burial, birth and death registration, a first name. 
Sometimes, they even consider holding the baby in their arms. Some women found the words to express the 
inner conflict that was so difficult for them to bear. Caroline remarked, “My heart tells me it’s my baby, and my 
mind says will I know how to care for this child?”. Marielle, one of the respondents who described the decision 
to interrupt her pregnancy as a decision to “kill” the child, further described the alternative as “counter-intuitive” 
and “inhumane,” especially for a mother. She could understand her husband’s wish to interrupt the pregnancy for 
the sake of their marriage and the child they already had, but insisted on the irrepressible “animal” instincts 
leading her in the opposite direction.  
Therefore, the interviews revealed that the decision is frequently experienced as an ordeal due to its very nature, 
and because it gives rise to painfully ambivalent feelings. At such times, in speaking to the other, one tries to 
convince both oneself and one’s interlocutor that one has chosen the lesser of the two evils, once and for all. Our 
interviews often served as opportunities to review the reasons for the decision. As a result, the interviews 
demonstrate the very dynamic of the decision, the person’s hesitations, the breakthrough factors for ethical 
reflection, and the nagging persistence of doubt and self-examination. 
 The decision to terminate or not the pregnancy and “eugenics choices” 
 
The difficuly character of the decision is barely related to the nature of the disease or of the disability by the 
patients. Considering the series of situations examined in the study, this may be explained first by the fact that, 
out of 28 cases, 9 were related to fatal pathologies. In these cases, patients did not reflect on the nature of the 
disability or the seriousness of the disease. The question they raised was that of the meaning for them of a 
decision to continue the pregnancy once they knew their child to be born would die few hours, days or weeks 
after the delivery. 
In the situations of non-fatal pathologies, the interviews abounded with every possible form of rejection or 
acceptance of physical and mental disability, and their ranking. No general trend emerged from them. The word 
“disability” [“handicap,” in French] was not invariably applied by the patients. Some spoke more readily of 
“disease,” of “difference,” of an opposition between “normal” and “abnormal.” These variations in terminology 
hint that although each individual has constructed his or her own image of disability, usually limited to the 
representation of a trisomic person, the patients had not elaborated to any great degree the issue of disability, 
difference, or “abnormality.” Sometimes, the interview itself was an opportunity to think about the matter. In one 
third of these situations involving a non-fatal pathology, the type of disability or pathology was at least partial 
grounds for the decision. For example, Caroline and Mathieu believe that dwarfism and sterility are not 
“harmless” disabilities. For Marie, the issue of “abnormality” was relevant in both practical and symbolic terms, 
and above all for the “parents,” who must “accept the responsibility for a child who is not normal.” She herself 
said she could cope with a cardiac malformation, but not with a cleft palate or clubfoot. Elodie, who had been 
notified of a diagnosis of trisomy 21, said she could not imagine herself as the mother “of a handicapped child.” 
She said she was grateful that science had progressed enough to make this knowledge available to the parents so 
they can “choose.” 
It turns out that the interviews rarely gave rise to discussion about the genetic aspects of the pathology that had 
been identified, even when the question of eugenics was explicitly asked. It was not always possible to introduce 
the question. When it was the case, it usually elicited expressions of indifference, like “this doesn’t count,” even 
when the intention to avoid transmitting the disease was present. When patients themselves broached the subject 
of eugenics, they defined the term vaguely, inappropriately, or not at all. In rare cases, eugenics was associated 
with a “punishment,” with something shameful that should be concealed. Several “patients” associated eugenics 
with medical progress, making it possible to eliminate “bad genes,” and to envisage a future free of disease. 
Others interpreted eugenics as something that engenders specific moral duties for the parents to refrain from 
transmitting a disease that could be identified in time, before birth. The word almost never indicated a moral and 
political problem from the patients’ point of view. When it was the case, as in Malika’s words quoted above, it 
was considered as less important issue than that of assuming the consequences of the decision in one’s daily life.  
This perspective cannot be simply explained with the assumption that these patients are in denial of the social 
consequences of their own choices, or that they refuse any association whatseover with “eugenics” due to the 
negative moral charge carried by the term. First of all, they claim to be the only legitimate decision-makers. 
They are not worried about the supposedly perverse effect of the moral and political value of “autonomy” that 
appear in other national contexts as a screen of smoke used by governments to control life and fetus’ quality 
(Schwennesen, 2010). In addition, as we have seen, they give their preference to reasons based on the 
consideration of their personal, couple and family life and of the (imagined) quality of life of the child to be 
born. In doing so, they partly agree with the French law that does not relate the decision to terminate a pregnancy 
to an established list of pathologies that would ground it in every case. To them, the general idea according to 
which it is morally legitimate to terminate a pregnancy because of such and such disease or deficiency, and 
especially cognitive ones (Singer, 1985 et 2002) is meaningless. The case by case approach set by the law fits 
their expectations. However, they also disagree with this law because it does not let them be the decision-
makers. This is the crucial issue raised by prenatal diagnosis to them, much more than the possible eugenics 
character of the decision to be made. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Two questions may be derived from the analysis presented in this article, that deserve further inquiry, including 
a wider approach in statistical terms. The first question is related to the great similarity between the reasons 
formulated to continue or to terminate the pregnancy, regardless of the pathology identified thanks to prenatal 
diagnosis. This result of the study – the wide use of the same two reasons for whatever purpose - is even more 
striking when we consider that interviewed patients covered a cross-section of the population that is 
heterogeneous in all three of the following respects: age; family, economic, social, and civil status; and 
background of the pregnancy. Ages ranged from 21 to 42 for the women and from 23 to 53 for the men. They 
came from a broad variety of occupational categories. Some were French citizens; some were not; some resided 
on French territory and some did not; some possessed the proper French identification documents and some did 
not. The background of the pregnancies also differed. Some of the women or couples already had children when 
we met them; others did not. Some of them were confronting the decision alone; others had to deal with their 
families. About 50% of them professed religious convictions (Islam, Catholic or Protestant Christianity, 
Judaism, or Buddhism). Those who declared a religion told us they expressed it in a variety of different ways: as 
a belief, a practice, a spiritual quest, or in counseling with a person from a religious background.  
The second question lies in the issue of “eugenics choices”. It is striking to observe that the reasoning of the 
patients we interviewed was more or less diametrically opposed to the terms prevailing in the seemingly 
“endless” debate on eugenics in France (Roussel 1996; Le Dref 2013)3. Indeed, they raise a delicate issue to be 
considered by French society: should the rejection of eugenics choices be an absolute ethical and legal principle? 
Or should this society grant moral legitimacy to the decisions to terminate a pregnancy (that amount to few 
thousands per year), and stop stigmatizing the patients and the medical teams with the suspicion of eugenics ? In 
other words, which place is to be given, in moral reasoning, to the individual freedom to decide what is good for !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 In France, this debate makes little or no reference to the idea of “geneticization,” defined as a societal or 
cultural tendency to reduce individuals to their DNA (Lippman 1992), the sociological reality of which remains 
to be proved (Hedgecoe 2009). Nor is it related to human enhancement or to the quest for genetic perfection, in 
contrast to other contexts where this issue is more often discussed (Rose 2007; Savulescu and Bostrom, 2009; 
Bateman and Gayon 2015). This question is not entirely absent from the ethical discussion (Gayon and Jacobi 
2006). However, the crux of the debate concerns determining the threshold for a life worth living, based on the 
hypothesis that certain types of life perceived as “defective” would be eliminated and the moral legitimacy of 
such a threshold (Gavarini 1990; Gaille 2010; Gaille et Viot, 2012; Vassy 2011 et 2014b). 
oneself, one’s couple and one’s family ? Which moral status is to be granted to women and parental couples’ 
capacity to tell what they feel responsible for and to assess the consequences of a birth on their lives over the 
long term? 
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